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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
Plaintiff/Respondent / 
vs. / Case No. 970610-CA 
DONALD D. BOSTWICK, / Judge 
Defendant/Appellant. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appeal from a final order finding Appellant guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance in violation of Section 
58-37-8(2), U.C.A. (1953, as amended), a Second Degree Felony 
(R. 001), possession of a controlled substance in violation of 
Section 58-37-8, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), a Class B Misdemeanor 
and violation of drug paraphernalia act in violation of Section 
58-37A5(l), U.C.A. (1953, as amended), a Class B Misdemeanor, and 
sentencing Appellant to a term as to Count I, 1 to 15 years in the 
Utah State Prison; Count II, 180 days jail and as to Count III, 180 
days jail; all counts to run concurrently (R. 156-375 and 134). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT 1 
Did defense counsel deny Appellant's right to 
effective assistance of counsel in violation 
of his constitutional right to counsel as 
guaranteed by U.S. Constitution, Sixth 
Amendment; U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth 
Amendment; Utah Constitution, Sections 7 and 
12; See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 667, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (1990). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW -
The Appellant Court must decide if the trial record is 
adequate to permit decision on the issues where the Appellant is 
now represented by counsel other than trial counsel. Further, 
where ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first 
time on appeal, the Appellate Court must determine, as a matter of 
law, whether the Appellant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Callahan, 826 P.2d 590 (Utah App. Ct. 1993) In 
this case, Appellant must establish: 
(a) That his counsel's performance was so deficient as to 
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness; 
(b) But for his counsel's deficient performance, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. Defense counsel's failure cannot be deemed trial 
strategy, in that there was no possible benefit for Appellant from 
counsel's failure. State v. Hovator, 914 P.2d 37 (Utah 1996). 
Defense counsel failed to file any Motion to Suppress evidence that 
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was admitted when that evidence was collected by police pursuant to 
an illegal search of a stolen car and Appellant's closed container 
located in that stolen car and identified by Appellant to be his. 
POINT II 
WAS APPELLANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS TO DUE 
PROCESS WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT REFUSED 
TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO EXAMINE HIS HOSTILE 
WITNESS CONCERNING HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE 
STOLEN CAR AND DRUGS FOUND THEREIN, WHERE THE 
WITNESS HAS INFORMATION CONCERNING EVIDENCE OF 
HIS CULPABILITY AND INVOLVEMENT IN REFERENCE 
TO THE OFFENSES WITH WHICH APPELLANT WAS 
CHARGED? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellant Court must decide whether the trial Judge 
correctly applied the law when he limited examination of 
Appellant's hostile witness and effectively deprived Appellant of 
his defense of establishing evidence of the witness' culpability 
with regards to the charges for which Appellant was on trial, thus 
denying Appellant a fair trial in violation of Appellant's U.S. 
Constitutional Fourteenth Amendment and Utah Constitutional Article 
1, Sections 7 and 12, rights to due process. If the omitted 
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, 
constitutional error has been committed. State v. Shabata, 678 
P.2d 785 (Utah 1984); Sections 401 - 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
See also People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99 (CA 1986) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was convicted of one count of possession of a 
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controlled substance, a Second Degree Felony; one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, a Class B Misdemeanor and one 
count of drug paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, after a jury 
trial held in Weber County District Court, before the Honorable 
Parley R. Baldwin. 
During the trial, police officers testified that they 
recovered a stolen car as a result of a tip from a citizen and 
found in that stolen car the Appellant and his girlfriend. They 
removed the couple from the car and before any arrests were made 
and in the absence of an inventory search, illegally searched and 
seized evidence that was admitted into evidence against Appellant. 
Defense counsel failed to file any Suppression Motion to stop the 
admission of the evidence and also failed to object to the 
introduction of any evidence seized in violation of Appellant's 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 
of the Utah Constitution. 
The evidence was clearly inadmissible and would have been 
suppressed had Appellant's trial attorney made timely Motions. 
In addition, the defense counsel at trial called an individual 
to the stand from the Utah State Prison. Apparently, this witness 
had signed a statement acknowledging some culpability involving the 
charges against Appellant. The witness began to assert his 5th 
Amendment right to remain silent and the trial Judge refused trial 
counsel any opportunity to examine this witness, even though the 
4 
STATE OF UTAH VS. BOSTWICK 
Case No.: 970610-CA 
witness had been classified as a hostile witness. The result of 
the trial Court's refusal to allow this evidence of third party 
culpability violated Appellant's due process rights to a fair 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
August 25, 1997, Appellant was at his home at 13 85 North 
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah (R. 156-307) when he received a 
visit from an acquaintance by the nickname of Dozer. (R. 156-277 
and 3 08) Dozer told Appellant that he had a car and invited 
Appellant to take a ride with him that evening. (R. 156-309) 
Dozer drove Appellant and Appellant's girlfriend, hereinafter 
referred to as Karen, up Ogden Canyon to a location commonly known 
as the "hot pots". (R. 156-280 and 310) When the trio arrived at 
the hot pots, Dozer went for a swim while Appellant changed his 
clothes and then sat in the front driver's seat with Karen to relax 
and share in a bit of conversation. (R 156-208 and 310) 
During the early morning hours of August 26, 1997, at the time 
Appellant and Karen were sitting in Dozer's car, Jacob Inches, a 
network technician, was also going to soak at the hot pots. 
(R. 156-68 and 69) Inches testified that he was going for a soak, 
notwithstanding the fact that the prior summer, the area had become 
a heavy area for drug use with syringes and "other stuff" laying 
around (R. 156-69) Mr. Inches had been a resident of that area 
for approximately fifteen (15) years. (R. 156-69) Inches 
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testified that taking a soak in the hot pots at 2:00 a.m. was the 
most popular time. (R. 156-69) 
Inches testified that when he arrived at the area, he parked 
his car and began to walk to the path leading to the hot pots, 
Karen, however, remembered that a strange car had pulled straight 
in front of the Ford with the headlights directly on Karen and 
Appellant (R. 156-28 0) and remained parked in this manner until a 
deputy sheriff arrived. (R. 156-71 and 281) Inches testified that 
he observed the Ford in which Karen and Appellant were sitting 
(R. 156-71 and 72) and Inches then changed his story by saying that 
he observed the Ford pull over and no one exit the vehicle. 
(R. 156-72) He stated he walked past the Ford, down the path to 
the hot pots and stopped as a result of a "feeling something wasn't 
right". As its an area of the canyon which had a high vandalism 
rate, including slashed tires and broken auto windows. (R. 156-72) 
In fact, Inches had witnessed an auto burglary earlier that summer. 
(R. 156-77) Inches turned around and started back toward his 
vehicle. (R. 156-73) As Inches was returning to his vehicle, he 
said he memorized the rear license plate number on the Ford. He 
returned to his car and pulled it out in a manner so that he was 
able to see the front plate number on the Ford. (R. 156-74) 
Inches then testified that he pulled out and headed down the 
canyon, but did a U turn and came back up the canyon. He checked 
the rear plate again and accomplished another U turn and again 
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checked the front plate of the Ford. (R. 156-74 and 75) The front 
and rear plate numbers were different. (R. 156-77 and 97) He then 
pulled over to the side of the road and stopped at the same 
approximate location as when he first parked. (R. 156-75) Inches 
then used his cell phone to contact Weber County Sheriff concerning 
a suspicious vehicle. (R. 156-78) Inches remained in his car 
until two (2) deputy sheriffs arrived about fifteen (15) minutes 
later. He remained for a few minutes and then left the scene. 
(R. 156-79) Inches went on to testify that he did not go home, but 
drove past the area again waiting for the sheriffs to leave so that 
he could go down and soak in the hot pots. (R. 156-81) During one 
of his drive-bys, Inches reported to the jury that he observed two 
(2) individuals standing in front of the vehicle up against the 
rocks. (R. 156-81) He also stated that he observed the officers 
searching the Ford vehicle. (R. 156-85) Inches returned intending 
to soak, but found two (2) sheriff vehicles there and another van 
with two (2) people in it. The suspicious Ford was still present 
at the scene. (R. 156-85) Rather than go for his soak, Inches 
began looking over the Ford and observing its contents, apparently 
without objection from the officers present at the scene. 
(R. 156-80) He then proceeded to his soak, where he remained for 
another hour. 
By this time, Russell Swain had been notified that his stolen 
car had been recovered and was directed to Ogden Canyon where the 
7 
STATE OF UTAH VS. BOSTWICK 
Case NO.: 970610-CA 
car had remained parked and it was released to him at about 4:00 
a.m. (R. 156-24) The police gave Mr. Swain the car and all of 
its contents not otherwise seized. (R. 156-240) Swain then drove 
his car from the hot pot area to his home. Swain went to some 
extent in describing articles that he found in the car, including 
huge bolt cutters and cert locks and speculated that much of the 
articles found could have been used as burglary tools. 
(R. 156-242) Apparently, there was no prosecution for theft, 
possession of stolen property or burglary. (R. 156-250) Swain 
described the back seat as appearing that someone had been living 
out of the car. In contrast, the brown bag the officers 
inadvertently left in the car contained folded clothing and men and 
women toiletries such as deodorant. Swain stated that the odor in 
the car was not consistent with anyone using deodorant or wearing 
clean clothes. (R. 156-254) 
After Mr. Inches finished his soak, he returned back to the 
area of the suspicious vehicle and everyone had gone, including the 
Ford. He testified that the reason for his return was to locate 
anything that someone may have dropped. (R. 156-86) He testified 
that he found a small piece of magazine that had been folded into 
a small size. He opened the container, observed brown powder, re-
closed the package, stored it in his empty film canister and phoned 
the sheriff's office. (R. 156-86 and 87) Subsequently, Inches met 
Sergeant Haney, a deputy sheriff, at the 26th Street Station and 
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delivered the container. (R. 156-88) 
Officer Haney's police report stated that Inches observed 
Karen drop the bindle that he subsequently turned over to the 
police, but Inches denied ever seeing anyone drop anything. 
(R. 156-93) 
Haney responded to Inches' call concerning the suspicious 
vehicle. (R. 156-98) Upon his arrival, Haney asked Appellant if 
the Ford vehicle belonged to him. (R. 156-100) Appellant 
responded that the car was not his, but they had come to the hot 
pots with a friend. (R. 156-100) Even though Appellant stated 
that the friend with the car had gone down to the hot pots, Haney 
never checked and never found Dozer. (R. 156-10 0) Haney 
subsequently identified the vehicle as stolen (R. 156-102) and 
asked Appellant and Karen to get out of the car. (R. 156-103) 
Haney told Karen that he remembered her from a 198 9 drug arrest and 
accused Karen of being involved with an illegal drug lab at that 
time. He asked her what drugs she had and, as he began his search 
of the car and stated that he knew Karen had possession of drugs. 
(R. 156-283 and 284) Haney had Officer Johansen watch the pair as 
Haney turned his attention to the Ford and continued his search. 
He stated he identified a brass pipe and a baggy containing what 
appeared to be marijuana on the passenger side of the vehicle. 
(R. 156-104 and 105) Haney, in furtherance of his search of the 
vehicle, also found a plastic bottle stuffed between the front seat 
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cushions. (R. 156-107) The bottle contained what appeared to be 
methamphetamine. The owner of the car, Russell Swain, stated that 
the cushions were similar to couch cushions, but an object could 
probably be stuffed between. (R. 156-107) Haney also found a 
black case. Rather than obtaining a warrant or impounding the 
vehicle, Haney opened the case and discovered six (6) 1/2 c.c. 
syringes, two (2) empty plastic baggies, a nail file and a Q-tip. 
One (1) of the syringes was full of a brown liquid. (R. 156-107) 
Haney also discovered two (2) closed travel type bags in the 
back seat of the vehicle. One (1) was purple and one (1) was 
brown. (R. 156-110) Appellant told the officer that the items in 
the brown bag belonged to both himself and Karen. (R. 156-110) No 
one claimed the purple bag. (R. 156-288) Both bags were searched 
without consent of either party, without a search warrant inventory 
authorization. Apparently, neither Appellant nor Karen had been 
placed under arrest, so the search was not incident to an 
inventory. (R. 156-110 and 111) In the brown bag was found a 
Harmon's pharmacy sack containing two (2) spoons that had a powder 
residue on them and six (6) 1/2 c.c. syringes, together with a 
small candle. (R. 156-111 and 112) The brown bag was left behind 
inadvertently when the evidence was transferred to a police car, 
(R. 156-111 and 112) It is not clear from the transcript whether 
any of the items in the Harmon's sack other than the candle were 
seized. (R. 156-112) The officers also recovered a propane torch, 
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which was located on the floor behind the driver's seat. Johansen 
searched Karen's purse and discovered a white plastic bottle with 
liquid and several plastic baggies with residue. (R. 156-113 and 
114) Karen's purse, glasses and other pieces of property were left 
in the car when it was turned over to the owner or otherwise lost 
by police and never returned to Karen. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
Did defense counsel deny Appellant's right to 
effective assistance of counsel in violation 
of his constitutional right to counsel as 
guaranteed by U.S. Constitution, Sixth 
Amendment; U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth 
Amendment; Utah Constitution, Sections 7 and 
12; See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 667, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (1990). 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution 
guarantee persons charged with a criminal offense the right to 
effective assistance of counsel to assist in their defense. See 
U.S. Constitution Amendment VI; U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV, 
Section 1; Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7; Utah 
Constitution Article 1, Section 12; see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 667, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (1990). Appellant was denied his 
constitutionally guaranteed right and therefore, the trial Court's 
final judgment and order must be reversed. 
To successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of 
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counsel, the Appellant must show that (1) his counsel's performance 
was objectively deficient, and (2) that there exists a reasonable 
probability that but for his counsel's deficient conduct, the 
verdict would have been more favorable to the Appellant. State v. 
Hovator, 914 P.2d 37 (Utah 1966); State v. Templin, supra at 186-
87; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. supra at 688. 
In the case in chief, a citizen reported to the police a 
suspicious vehicle which had different license plate numbers on the 
front and rear of the vehicle. (R. 156-77 and 97) When a Deputy 
Weber County Sheriff reached the location of the vehicle, he found 
Appellant and a woman seated in the car. (R. 156-98) He asked 
both people to exit the car and before arresting anyone, conducted 
a thorough search of the car. (R. 156-104) During this search, 
Officer Haney came across two (2) closed bags located in the back 
seat of the car. (R. 156-110 and 288) Appellant claimed ownership 
of the brown bag. Officer Haney searched the bag without the 
consent of Appellant and before Appellant was placed under arrest. 
At this point in time, the officer had discovered that the 
suspicious vehicle had been stolen. (R. 156-102) There was no 
evidence that Appellant had the keys to the car or, in fact, no 
evidence that Appellant had stolen the car. 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
"warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless 
exigent circumstances require actions before a warrant can be 
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obtained." State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984); 
see also Katz v. U.S. , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967) 
Under Utah's codification of search and seizure principles, 
search by a peace officer requires probable or "reasonable" cause. 
U.C.A. Section 77-7-2 (1953, as amended) 
With respect to a warrantless search, the burden is on the 
State to show both probable cause and exigent circumstances. State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990) 
Officer Haney entered Appellant's brown bag without probable 
or reasonable cause and in the absence of exigent circumstances. 
Clearly, the Appellant was in no position to take the brown bag 
anywhere or to conceal anything contained therein. The officer was 
clearly not going to allow the Appellant to hop in the car and 
drive off. Because no arrests had been made, the search was not 
incident to arrest. In addition, there is no evidence that the 
search was an inventory search conducted pursuant to the proper 
procedure. Indeed, if the police had properly impounded the 
vehicle rather than turning it over to the owners at 4:00 in the 
morning, they would not have lost the bag and much of Appellant's 
girlfriend's property, including her glasses. As far as the two 
(2) other bags are concerned, Appellant did not claim any ownership 
and therefore had no standing to consent to their search and had no 
expectation of privacy therein. However, this fact does not 
relieve the officer's responsibility to properly inventory the 
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contents after an arrest was made and pursuant to established 
procedures. In the absence of either, any item found in the car 
that was not in plain view could not be seized and should have been 
suppressed by the Court. 
As stated in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 
1996) and State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695 at 697 (Utah App. 1997), 
"a warrantless automobile search is not justified by probable cause 
alone, but must also be premised upon exigent circumstances." 
"Exigent circumstances exist when the car is movable, the occupants 
are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a 
warrant must be obtained." Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237 (emphasis is 
added) Clearly, the officers were not going to allow Appellant to 
drive away in a stolen car. There was absolutely no reason why the 
officers should not be required to obtain a warrant, or at the very 
least, conduct a proper inventory search. Defense counsel's 
failure to file and argue a motion to suppress the evidence cannot 
be deemed trial strategy, in that there was no possible benefit for 
Appellant from his failures. State v. Hovator, 914 P. 2d at 37. 
This reasoning applies to all evidence found in the car, except 
those items on the floor of the passenger side of the car. Without 
this evidence, Appellant would not have been convicted of a Second 
Degree Felony. 
14 
STATE OF UTAH VS. BOSTWICK 
Case NO.: 970610-CA 
POINT II 
WAS APPELLANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS TO DUE 
PROCESS VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO 
ALLOW APPELLANT TO EXAMINE HIS HOSTILE WITNESS 
CONCERNING HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE STOLEN CAR 
AND DRUGS FOUND THEREIN, WHERE THE WITNESS HAS 
INFORMATION CONCERNING EVIDENCE OF HIS 
CULPABILITY AND INVOLVEMENT IN REFERENCE TO 
THE OFFENSES WITH WHICH APPELLANT WAS CHARGED? 
The defense counsel, during Appellant's case in chief, called 
Paul Van Dyke to testify for Appellant. Mr. Van Dyke, also known 
as Dozier, was housed at the Utah State Prison. (R. 156-255) When 
counsel asked the witness what he was in prison for, the witness 
replied "doesn't concern you." (R. 156-255) Defense counsel had 
no knowledge that this witness would be hostile until the day 
before trial. (R. 156-262) The Court then advised the witness of 
his Miranda rights. Defense counsel then asked the witness if he 
remembered meeting with counsel a month or so before Appellant's 
trial. The witness continued to assert a constitutional privilege 
and was not instructed to answer the question even though an 
admission to meeting with counsel could in no way incriminate the 
witness. (R. 156-257) However, eventually, the witness did 
acknowledge having met with defense counsel some time before 
Appellant's trial. (R. 156-258) 
The trial Court denied Appellant's fiduciary guaranteed right 
to present witnesses in his own defense. Taylor v. Illinois, 
(1988) 484 U.S. 400, 408, 108 S. Ct. 646, 652, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798; 
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Camber v. Mississippi, (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302, 95 S. Ct. 1038, 
1049, 35 L. Ed.2d 297. 
Defense counsel asked the witness if he "signed a statement of 
guilt on a ..." A hearsay objection was raised by the prosecuting 
attorney. (R. 156-259) Thereafter, a meeting was held in 
chambers. (R. 156-259) The trial Judge stated that the witnesses' 
prior statement would not come before the jury, but counsel was 
invited to continue to ask questions of the witness. 
(R. 156-264-265) Thereafter, the Court allowed defense counsel to 
treat the witness as hostile. (R. 156-268) The witness then began 
to answer a limited amount of questions, but the Court had already 
admonished counsel that he was not to go into any information 
contained in the witnesses' statement. (R. 156-269) The trial 
Court's restriction of information about which defense counsel 
could ask effectively denied Appellant the right to produce 
evidence of third party culpability. Although the witness did 
admit being with Appellant the night in question and being with him 
in a car, the witness stood on his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent as to who was driving the car or the type of vehicle it was 
and as to whom the drugs in containers belonged. (R. 156-271) 
The Court's limitation of questioning this witness effectively 
denied Appellant his right to due .process and a fair trial. It was 
paramount to the defense that counsel be permitted to question the 
witness as to prior oral statements made by the witness. It was 
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the juries province to check the credibility of the witness as to 
each response to each question. 
As stated in Wigmore on Evidence (1A Wigmore Evidence (Tillers 
Rev. Ed. 1980) Sections 139 P. 1724) , "if the evidence is really of 
no appreciable value, no harm is done in admitting it, but if the 
evidence is in truth calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the 
Court should not attempt to decide for the jury that this doubt is 
purely speculative and fantastic, but should afford the accused 
every opportunity to create that doubt." 
As stated in Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, "relevant 
evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Certainly defense counsel had every right to question 
the witness about a prior conversation they had. Whatever response 
given by the witness was to the jury to give credibility and/or 
weight. The trial Judge committed prejudicial and harmful error 
when he closed the door on defense counsel's only was to bring 
third party culpability before the jury. 
The proper inquiry as to the admission of third party 
culpability evidence is whether that evidence could raise a 
reasonable doubt as to Appellant's guilt on any count charged. 
Then it is up to the Court to evaluate that evidence within the 
parameters of Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence. In other words, 
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treat the third party culpability evidence like any other evidence 
if relevant, it is admissible under Rule 401 unless its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, 
prejudice or confusion pursuant to Rule 403. 
In the case in chief, the trial Court did not evaluate 
Appellant's third party culpability evidence under the guidance of 
the Rules of Evidence, but seemed more concerned with protecting a 
witness that it over looked protecting a Defendant who is presumed 
innocent until convicted by a jury. Defense counsel should have 
been given every opportunity to question the witness concerning 
statements made to counsel some time before trial and the jury 
should have been given the opportunity to evaluate any response 
from the witness. Also, defense counsel had every right to 
question the witness concerning the stolen car and drugs found in 
the car, whether in a container or in plain view. 
"To be admissible, defense evidence tending to show that a 
third party is guilty of an offense charged need not show 
substantial proof of a probability that the third party committed 
the act; it need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of 
Defendant's guilt." People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99, 104 (Cal. 1986), 
and the Court's error was plain error, not harmless because 
Appellant has shown that the error had substantial and injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. The jury 
was told the car containing the drug evidence was stolen. The only 
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evidence that could have limited the implication that Appellant 
stole the car or was in actual possession of the car, rather that 
merely sitting therein, was Dozier. Defense counsel was not even 
permitted to ask him about possession of the car, much less the 
drugs. Clearly, this error had a substantial and injurious affect 
or influence in determining the jury's verdict. See Frierson v. 
Calderon, 968 F. Supp. 497, 507 (CD. Cal. 1997). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court committed reversible error when it did not 
allow Appellant's attorney to properly question the hostile 
witness, Paul Van Dyke. Appellant contends that this would have 
established that he did not steal the car and was only a guest in 
it, and that any contraband found in the car was not his. This 
would have established that Van Dyke had already waived his 
constitutional rights by making a confession or admission to 
Defendant's attorney. 
The defense attorney failed to give Defendant effective 
assistance of counsel by not objecting to the no warrant search and 
by not moving for a new trial when the Court refused to let him ask 
Van Dyke about the admissions and confessions that he had made to 
him. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts and arguments set above, the Appellant has 
not had a fair trial and his conviction should be reversed, and the 
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case remanded to the District Court for a new trial when he will be 
afforded a fair trial. 
Respectfully submitted this / ^ day of June, 1998 
<&ANDINE SALERNO, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
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it, and that any contraband found in the car was not his. This 
would have established that Van Dyke had already waived his 
constitutional rights by making a confession or admission to 
Defendant's attorney. 
The defense attorney failed to give Defendant effective 
assistance of counsel by not objecting to the no warrant search and 
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section (8) Each separate violation of this subsection is a 
third degree felony and is also subject to a civil penalty 
not to exceed $5,000 
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1 
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion 
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall 
be deposited in the General Fund 
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit 
information to the database as required under this section 
after the division has submitted a specific writ ten request 
for the information or when the division determines the 
individual has a demonstrable pat tern of failing to submit 
the information as required is grounds for the division to 
take the following actions in accordance with Section 
58-1-401 
d) refuse to issue a license to the individual, 
(n) refuse to renew the individual's license, 
(m) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation 
the license, 
dv) issue a public or private reprimand to the 
individual, 
(v) issue a cease and desist order, and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the 
required information is not submitted 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (a)(vi) 
shall be deposited in the General Fund 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion 
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the 
database in accordance with this section may not be held 
civilly liable for having submitted the information 
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to 
establish and operate the database shall be funded by 
appropriations from the General Fund 
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated with-
out the use of any resources within the Commerce Service 
Fund 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting 
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the 
submitting drug outlet 1996 
58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally 
(I) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess 
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance, 
(n) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance, 
(m) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute, or 
(IV) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
where 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages 
in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d that is a felony, and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing 
series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions that are undertaken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervi, 
sor, or any other position of management 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) 
with respect to 
d) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or ^ 
controlled substance analog is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent con. 
viction is guilty of a first degree felony, 
(n) a substance classified m Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second 
degree felony, or 
(m) a substance classified m Schedule V is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse-
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
seven years and which may be for life Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties 
(a) It is unlawful 
d) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting m the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this subsection, 
(u) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances m any of those locations, 
(in) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)d) with respect to 
d) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
is guilty of a second degree felony, 
(n) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, man-
juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, or 
(m) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection! 
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section^ 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater tha% 
provided in Subsection (2)(b) 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possesj 
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that person 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty thaffi 
provided in this subsection ^ 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) ^ { S 
respect to all other controlled substances not included ig| 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (n), or (m), including less than o°3 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanors 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class® 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent convictKJH 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony
 > ;™ 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsecti(!B 
(2)(a)(n) or (2)(a)(m) is 
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(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
at tempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to ut ter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is com-
mitted: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through 
(viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of 
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of 
not less than five years if the penalty that would other-
wise have been established but for this subsection would 
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree 
felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under 
this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
subsection tha t the actor mistakenly believed the indi-
vidual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
tha t the actor mistakenly believed that the location where 
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) 
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred 
was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty 
of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administra-
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal 
under federal law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evi-
dence or proof which shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character 
of the substance or substances. 
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not 
for humans , from prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction 
and supervision. 
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under 
this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in 
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
legitimate scope of his employment. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 1997 
58-37-8.5. Applicabi l i ty of Title 76 prosecut ions under 
th is chapter. 
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters 
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this 
chapter. 1997 
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(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of 
sales of the object to the total sales of the business 
enterprise; 
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the 
object in the community; and 
(13) expert testimony concerning its use. 1981 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with 
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, culti-
vate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, pro-
duce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a 
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this 
chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with 
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any 
drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will 
be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manu-
facture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, 
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, 
inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body in violation of this act. Any person who violates 
this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug 
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three 
years or more younger than the person making the delivery is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any 
newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any ad-
vertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is 
to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
1981 
58-37a-6. Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights . 
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and 
no property right can exist in it. 1981 
CHAPTER 37b 
IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
Section 
58-37b-l. Short title. 
58-37b-2. Definitions. 
58-37b-3. Considerations in determining whether sub-
stance is imitation controlled substance. 
58-37b-4. Manufacture, distribution or possession of sub-
stance unlawful — Penalty. 
58-37b-5. Repealed. 
58-37b-6. Use of substance unlawful — Penalty. 
58-37b-7. Advertisement of substance unlawful — Penalty. 
58-37b-8. Exemption of persons registered under Con-
trolled Substances Act. 
58-37b-l. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act." 1982 
58-37b-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Controlled substance" has the same meaning as 
* provided in Section 58-37-2. 
(2) "Distribute" means the actual, constructive, or at-
tempted sale, transfer, delivery, or dispensing to another 
of an imitation controlled substance. 
(3) "Imitation controlled substance" means a substani 
that is not a controlled substance or counterfeit controls 
substance, and which by overall dosage unit substantial*! 
resembles a specific controlled substance in appearand 
including its color, shape, or size. -^g 
(4) "Manufacture" means the production, preparatial 
compounding, processing, encapsulating, tableting, pJS 
aging or repackaging, labeling or relabeling, of an irn^ 
tion controlled substance. ^ 
58-37b-3. Considerat ions in de termin ing whether sril 
s tance is imitat ion control led substance. 2 | 
If the appearance of the dosage unit is not reasonal* 
sufficient to establish that the substance is an iinitaty 
controlled substance, as in liquids or powders, the followimj 
factors should be considered: -.3 
(1) statements made by an owner or by anyone else! 
control of the substance, concerning the nature of tl* 
substance, its use or effect, or its similarity to a controllej 
substance; ~|j 
(2) statements made to the recipient tha t the substang 
may be resold at a price substantially higher than tig 
usual and customary price" for the ingredients contained 
in the substance; M 
(3) whether the substance is packaged or labeled inf 
manner similar to that generally used for controflel 
substances; «jj| 
(4) evasive tactics or actions utilized by the owner t^ 
person in control of the substance to avoid detection^ 
law enforcement authorities; •$« 
(5) prior convictions of an owner or anyone in control* 
the object, under state or federal law related to control!* 
substances or fraud; and . 3 | | 
(6) the proximity of the substances to controlled sSP 
stances. 1^H 
58-37b-4. Manufacture, d is tr ibut ion or possession, 
substance unlawful — Penalty. ^jS 
It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, distribute^ 
possess with intent to distribute, an imitation control™ 
substance. Any person who violates this section is gui l ty© 
class A misdemeanor. yjmi 
58-37b-5. Repealed. 
58-3 7b-6. Use of substance unlawful — Penalty. £jg 
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess withihtt 
to use, an imitation controlled substance. Any person.-^ 
violates this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
58-37b-7. Advert i sement of substance unlawful —* 
alty. 
It is unlawful for any person to place any newsp 
magazine, handbill, or other publication, or to post or ( 
ute in any public place, any advertisement or solicitation| 
reasonable knowledge that the purpose of the advertised 
or solicitation is to promote the distribution of imi^ 
controlled substances. Any person who violates this sectioj 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
58-37b-8. Exempt ion of persons regis tered under * 
trol led Substances Act. 
No civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by ' 
this act on any person registered under the 
Controlled^ 
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possess 
imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or i 
gational new drug by a registered practitioner in f^° 
77-7-2 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30i 
77-7-2. By p e a c e officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in 
the presence of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of 
the physical senses or any device that enhances the 
acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or 
records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony 
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable 
cause for believing the peison may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property be-
longing to another person. 1986 
77-7-3. By p r i v a t e p e r s o n s . 
A private person may arrest another: 
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his 
presence; or 
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has 
reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has com-
mitted it. i960 
77-7-4. M a g i s t r a t e m a y ora l ly o r d e r a r r e s t . 
A magistrate may orally require a peace officer to arrest 
anyone committing or attempting to commit a public offense in 
the presence of the magistrate, and, in the case of an emer-
gency, when probable cause exists, a magistrate may orally 
authorize a peace officer to arrest a person for a public offense, 
and thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall be 
filed against the person arrested. 1980 
77-7-5. I s s u a n c e of w a r r a n t — Time a n d p l ace a r r e s t s 
m a y b e m a d e — C o n t e n t s of w a r r a n t — Re-
spons ib i l i ty for t r a n s p o r t i n g p r i s o n e r s — 
C o u r t c l e rk to d i s p e n s e r e s t i t u t i o n for t r a n s -
p o r t a t i o n . 
(1) A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon 
finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested 
has committed a public offense. If the offense charged is: 
(a) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at 
any time of the day or night; or 
(b) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be 
made at night only if: 
(i) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do 
so on the warrant; 
(ii) the person to be arrested is upon a public 
highway, in a public place, or in a place open to or 
accessible to the public; or 
(hi) the person to be arrested is encountered by a 
peace officer in the regular course of that peace 
officer's investigation of a criminal offense unrelated 
to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest. 
(2) (a) If the magistrate determines that the accused must 
appear in court, the magistrate shall include in the arrest 
warrant the name of the law enforcement agency in the 
county or municipality with jurisdiction over the offense 
charged. 
(b) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the 
magistrate under Subsection (a) is responsible for 
providing inter-county transportation of the defen-
dant, if necessary, from the arresting law enforce-
ment agency to the court site. 
(ii) The law enforcement agency named on the 
warrant may contract with another law enforcement 
agency to have a defendant transported. 
(c) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by tk$ 
magistrate under Subsection (a) as responsible f^M 
transporting the defendant shall provide to the com+t; 
clerk of the court in which the defendant is tried, an! 
affidavit stat ing that the defendant was transported! 
indicating the law enforcement agency responsible! 
for the transportation, and stating the number oil 
miles the defendant was transported. ^ 
(ii) The court clerk shall account for restitution! 
paid under Section 76-3-201 for governmental transS 
portation expenses and dispense restitution monies? 
collected by the court to the law enforcement agencp 
responsible for the transportation of a convicted dej 
fendant. 
77-7-5.5. R e p e a l e d . 
1991, 
1991 
77-7-6. M a n n e r of m a k i n g a r r e s t . 
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person 
being arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest 
him. Such notice shall not be required when: 
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger 
the life or safety of the officer or another person or will 
likely enable the party being arrested to escape; 
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the 
commission of, or an at tempt to commit, an offense; or 
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately 
after the commission of an offense or an escape. 
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in Subsec-
tion 78-24a-l(2), is arrested for an alleged violation of a, 
criminal law, including a local ordinance, the arresting 
officer shall assess the communicative abilities of the 
hearing-impaired person and conduct this notification, 
and any further notifications of rights, warnings, interro-
gations, or taking of statements, in a manner that accu: 
rately and effectively communicates with the hearing--
impaired person including qualified interpreters, lip 
reading, pen and paper, typewriters, computers with 
print-out capability, and telecommunications devices for 
the deaf. 
(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor to "bej 
considered by any court when evaluating whether state-
ments of a hearing-impaired person were made know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 1995 
77-7-7. F o r c e in m a k i n g a r r e s t . 
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after^ 
being informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person; 
arresting may use reasonable force to effect the arrest. Deadly 
force may be used only as provided in Section 76-2-404. 1980; 
77-7-8. D o o r s a n d w i n d o w s m a y b e b r o k e n , w h e n . 
To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony?-
and in all cases, a peace officer, may break the door or w i n d o ^ 
of the building in which the person to be arrested is, or % 
which there are reasonable grounds for believing him to be.;; 
Before making the break, the person shall demand admission^ 
and explain the purpose for which admission is desired>j 
Demand and explanation need not be given before b r e a k u p 
under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or where there &" 
reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed. 1980;; 
77-7-9. W e a p o n s m a y be t a k e n f rom p r i s o n e r . 
Any person making an arrest may seize from the perso^i 
arrested all weapons which he may have on or about his. 
person. *9da 
77-7-10. T e l e g r a p h o r t e l e p h o n e authorizat ion of e^" | 
e c u t i o n of a r r e s t w a r r a n t . r i 
Any magistrate may, by an endorsement on a warrant ° ^ | 
arrest, authorize by telegraph, telephone or other r e a s o n a b l e 
I UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Art. IV, § 4 
fcnts and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when 
Kjfied by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
t t e s , or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one 
[ t h e other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Ingress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made 
C0r to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall 
[any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
tction of the first Article; and that no State, without its 
Itasent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
ARTICLE VI 
[MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS] 
Oath of hssumption of public debt — Supreme Law -
face — Rel ig ious tests prohibited.] 
j [1.1 All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, 
tfore the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid 
[gainst the United States under this Constitution, as under 
£e Confederation. 
r[2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
ihich shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
Bade, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
[Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing. 
[3.J The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
md the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all 
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and 
tf the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to 
support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be 
required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under 
the United States. 
ARTICLE VII 
[ADOPTIONl 
(Ratification — Attestation.] 
: The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be 
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between 
the States so ratifying the same. Done in Convention by the 
unanimous consent of the states present the seventeenth day 
tf September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven 
Hundred and eighty seven, and of the independence of the 
United States of America the twelfth. In Witness Whereof we 
have hereunto subscribed our names, 
«ew Hampshire 
Massachusetts 
Connecticut 
New York 
New Jersey 
rennsylvania 
JOHN LANGDON, 
NICHOLAS GILMAN. 
NATHANIEL GORHAM, 
RUFUS KING. 
WM. SAML. JOHNSON, 
ROGER SHERMAN. 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON. 
WIL: LIVINGSTON, 
DAVID BREARLEY, 
WM. PATERSON, 
JONA: DAYTON. 
B FRANKLIN, 
THOMAS MIFFLIN, 
ROBT MORRIS, 
GEO. CLYMER, 
THOS. FITZSIMONS, 
JARED INGERSOLL, 
Delaware 
Maryland 
Virginia 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Georgia 
JAMES WILSON, 
Gouv MORRIS. 
GEO: READ, 
GUNNING BEDFORD JUN, 
JOHN DICKINSON, 
RICHARD BASSETT, 
JACO: BROOM. 
JAMES MCHENRY, 
DAN OF ST THOS. JENIFER, 
DANL CARROLL. 
JOHN BLAIR, 
JAMES MADISON JR. 
WM BLOUNT, 
RICHD DOBBS SPAIGHT, 
H U WILLIAMSON. 
J . RUTLEDGE, 
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY, 
CHARLES PINCKNEY, 
PIERCE BUTLER. 
WILLIAM FEW, 
ABR BALDWIN. 
In Convention Monday September 17th 1787. 
Present The States of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Hamilton 
from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. 
Resolved, 
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United 
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of 
this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a 
Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People 
thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for 
their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention 
assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice 
thereof to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as 
soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this 
Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled should 
fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States 
which shall have ratified the same, and a day on which the 
Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the 
Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Con-
stitution. That after such Publication the Electors, should be 
appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: 
That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the 
Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes 
certified, signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution 
requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress 
assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should 
convene at the Time and Place assigned; that the Senators 
should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose 
of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President; 
and, that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with 
the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
Constitution. 
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention. 
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. XVIII, § 1 
AMENDMENT XIII 
[{Slavery prohibited.] 
1
 ower to enforce amendment.] 
HEtio i i !• [Slavery prohibited.] 
HKfeither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
M&jshment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
Rjjvicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
B&ject to their jurisdiction. 
Rec. 2. [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t ] 
Bftmgress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
|5iate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Ejection 
ft. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
S. (Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
?3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
E4; [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
fe, eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Cit izenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protect ion.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
'State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
'due process of law; nor deny to any person within its j u r i s d i -
ction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [ R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s — Power to r e d u c e a p p o i n t -
m e n t . ] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3 . [Disqual i f ica t ion to ho ld office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt n o t to b e q u e s t i o n e d — Deb t s of 
the C o n f e d e r a c y a n d c la ims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec . 5. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Sect ion 1. [Right of cit izens to vote — Race or color 
not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec . 2. [Power to en force a m e n d m e n t . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax . ] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration. 
AMENDMENT XVII 
[Elect ion of s e n a t o r s . ] 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid 
as part of the Constitution. 
AMENDMENT XVIII 
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT 
XXI, SECTION 1.] 
Section 
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.] 
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Time limit for adoption.] 
Sec t ion 1. [National prohibit ion — Intoxicat ing li-
quor s . ] 
After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
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Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement 
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he 
may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper, he 
shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers, he shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall 
Commission all the Officers of the United States 
Sec. 4. [Impeachment.] 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors 
ARTICLE III 
[JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT] 
Section 
1 [Judicial power ] 
2 [Extent of judicial power — Supreme Court — Trial and 
places of trial ] 
3 [Treason, proof and punishment ] 
Section 1. [Judicial power.] 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish The Judges, 
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, 
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance m Office 
Sec. 2. [Extent of judicial power — Supreme Court — 
Trial and places of trial.] 
[1 ] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
Umted States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority,—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls,—to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction,—to Controversies to which the 
Umted States shall be a Party,—to Controversies between two 
or more States,—[between a State and Citizens of another 
State,]—between Citizens of different States,—between Citi-
zens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, [and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects ] 
[2 ] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors other public Min-
isters and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, 
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction In all the 
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have 
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make 
[3 ] The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury, and such Trial shall be held in the 
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed, but 
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at 
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have 
directed 
Sec. 3. [Treason, proof and punishment . ] 
[1 ] Treason against the United States, shall consist only in 
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, 
giving them Aid and Comfort No Person shall be convicted of 
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same 
overt Act, or on Confession m open Court 
[2 ] The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punish-
ment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work 
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the 
Person attainted 
ARTICLE IV 
[STATE AND TERRITORIAL RELATIONS] 
Section 
1 [Full faith and credit to records and judicial proceedings of 
states ] 
2 [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives from justice and 
service ] 
3 [Admission of states — Rules and regulations respecting 
the territory and property of the United 
States ] 
4 [Guaranty of republican form of government and against 
invasion J 
Section 1. [Full faith and credit to records and judi-
cial proceedings of states.] 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof 
Sec. 2. [Privi leges and immunit ies — Fugi t ives from 
just ice and service.] 
[1 ] The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States 
[2 ] A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or 
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found m 
another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of 
the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to 
the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime 
[3 ] No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under 
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence 
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the 
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due 
Sec. 3. [Admission of states — Rules and regulations 
respect ing the territory and property of the 
United States.] 
[1 ] New States may be admitted by the Congress into this 
Union, but no new State shall be formed or erected within the 
Jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the 
Junction of two or more States, or Par ts of States, without the 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as 
of the Congress 
[2 ] The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States, and nothing in 
this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any 
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State 
Sec. 4. [Guaranty of republ ican form of government 
and against invasion.] 
The United States shall guarantee to every State m this 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect 
each of them against Invasion, and on Application of the 
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot 
be convened) against domestic Violence 
ARTICLE V 
[AMENDMENT] 
[Mode of amendment . ] 
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall 
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Consti-
tution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds 
of the several States shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all 
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PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITU-
TION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or 
hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
|15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
[19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
Section 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
Sect ion 1. [Inherent and inal ienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right.
 1896 
Sec. 2. [All pol i t ical power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
1896 
Sec. 3 . [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Rel igious l iberty — No property qualification 
to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from denning the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by s tatute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
581 
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substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law 1988 (2nd s S ) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not 
be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but m no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay, and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal m 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a p a r t y 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons. ] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend m person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself, a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put m jeopardy for the same offense 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in par t at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by s ta tu te or rule 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indic tment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate , unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — j g ^ 
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house* 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizmZl 
shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing ta 
be seized
 18M 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of s p e e c h and of the press — LibeLl 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom rf 
speech or of the press In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ru th may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shatt 
appear to the jury that the mat ter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact i ^ 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors i89« 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only m levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or m giving them aid 
and comfort No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State 189i. 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation 1 8 * 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise* 
privilege or immunity 189* 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operat ion of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation^ 
18* 
Sec. 25. [Rights re ta ined by people . ] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to unpa1* 
or deny others retained by the people 1 8 * 
Sec. 26. [Provis ions mandatory and prohibitory^ 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory ao , 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to DJ 
otherwise 1 
Rule 104 UTAH KULES OF EVIDENCE 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any 
other or further statement which shows the character of the 
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made 
and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in 
question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be 
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmis-
sible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means 
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking ques-
tions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
Rule 104. Preliminary questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Pn-liniinary 
questions concerning the qualification of a person |.() be 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admisHil,j|j ty 0f 
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject. j . ( ) t n e 
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determine i.j,,n j t j s 
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with r«..o,,J(.ct t o 
[privileges. 
\ (b) Relevancy condit ioned on fact. When the rHpvancy 
^ e v i d e n c e depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact 
the court shall admit it upon, or subject to. the introrJijrf.mn 0f 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment, of the 
condition. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admish;o,|J ty 0f 
confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the h i r i n g of 
the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters sh;,Ij
 o e s o 
conducted when the interests of justice require, or v/h<.n a n 
accused is a witness and so requests. 
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused doe>.
 n o t , by 
testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subjecr. v, rT'oss-
examination as to other issues in the case. 
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not ...-.r. the 
right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence .-^<.Vant 
to weight or credibility. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
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Rule 105. Limited admissibility. 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party -.- ;v- o n e 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or L- >..-.rher 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall r^.,-,'- the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury a^-.r-i'-.-rly 
Rule 106. Remainder of or re lated writings
 f,r r e_ 
corded s tatements . 
When a writing or recorded statement or part v.* 
introduced by a party, an adverse par ty may re-j-
introduction at tha t time of any other part or <r_-
writing or recorded statement which ought in f a i r : ^ 
considered contemporaneously with it. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judic ia l not ice of adjudicat ive factt. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicia •, 
adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts . A judicially noticed fact must i> 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1 * 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trie 
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination b} 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be quesi 
(c) When discret ionary. A court may take judic 
whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judick 
requested by a par ty and supplied with the necest 
mation. 
' -<* of 
''•'•* not 
--•-. or 
'<••>-. t o 
'-**..ce, 
- ••-* if 
•'for-
fe) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled 
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as ' 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the ^ ^ 
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the requJ2S 
be made after judicial notice has been taken. fc 
(f) Time of taking not ice . Judicial notice may be t 
any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceed 
court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive aixri 
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall ia 
the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as cone 
any fact judicially noticed. 
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS. 
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil actiom*^* 
proceedings . !J*| 
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not otheniMl 
provided for by statute or by these rules, a presunwSgt 
imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burdea«£ 
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is mfc^ 
probable than its existence. .t:3§ 
(b) Inconsistent presumpt ions . If presumptions are V ' 
consistent, the presumption applies that is founded up* 
weightier considerations of policy If considerations of pofitr 
are of equal weight neither presumption applies. a%£ 
Rule 302. Applicabil ity of federal law in civil actio* 
and proceedings . .:' 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption 
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense at 
to which federal law supplies the rule of decision is deter-
mined in accordance with federal law. '" " 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY 
AND ITS LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
 t JJ . 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency t» 
make the existence of any fact tha t is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. ...-
Rule 402. Relevant ev idence general ly admissible; ir-
relevant ev idence inadmiss ib le . [•&.. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or'tfie 
Constitution of the state of Utah, s ta tute , or by these rules;«" 
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evident 
which is not relevant is not admissible. ' ^ 
Rule 403. Exclusion of re levant e v i d e n c e on g r o u n d s * 
prejudice, confusion, or w a s t e of time. _ B 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, orty 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needles* 
presentation of cumulative evidence. " ^ 
/ft: 
Rule 404. Character ev idence not admiss ib le to p r o ^ 
conduct; except ions; o ther cr imes . -^  
(a) Character ev idence generally. Evidence of a persoq* 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a paf 
ticular occasion, except: I* 
(1) Character of accused . Evidence of a pertinefl* 
trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prof 
ecution to rebut the same; „ 
(2) Character of vict im. Evidence of a pertinent traJ* 
of character of the victim of the crime offered by &* 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, <* 
